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1. Religious conversion and the Independence Principle 
 
Miguel and Catherine are both atheist philosophers and long-time friends from 
graduate school. Miguel respects Catherine and believes she is his epistemic peer. Both 
of them have been raised in a liberal environment where atheism is quite widespread. 
But they have also carefully thought about theism. Neither of them is a philosopher of 
religion, but they know the arguments for and against theism and they both agree that 
the arguments against outweigh the arguments for. As a result, both are quite 
complacent atheists;2 they think there is no serious case to be made for theism.  
Miguel meets Catherine at a philosophy conference—it’s been about a year since 
they last met. He has been looking forward to seeing his old friend. As they catch up 
over a cup of coffee, it becomes clear that Catherine is now a theist.  
“But why?” Miguel asks. “Didn’t you think all that theist philosophy is dubious, 
motivated reasoning?”  
“I changed my mind,” Catherine replies.  
This situation appears to be a case of peer disagreement. Miguel and Catherine 
are (presumably) equally thoughtful in the domain in question, and they have access to 
the same evidence. While their epistemic situation is not identical, they will still be 
similar enough to take each other to be epistemic peers, a situation that occurs 
frequently in everyday life.  
Epistemologists have debated whether one should conciliate, that is, revise one’s 
opinion that p,3 when faced with a disagreeing peer who holds that not-p, or whether 
one can remain steadfast. One principle that has been proposed to separate these two 
types of responses is the Independence Principle.  
 
Independence: In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s 
expressed belief about p, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify 
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Here I will not assume that one needs to split the difference in order to be a conciliationist.. 
my own belief about p, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the 
reasoning behind my initial belief about p.4 
 
Independence delivers a plausible verdict in a variety of cases, such as Christensen’s 
paradigmatic mental math case, where people disagree about the amount to pay in a 
restaurant where they are splitting the bill.5 But the principle might not apply to other 
cases. An example is elementary math,6 where someone you consider as an epistemic 
peer says that 2 + 2 = 5. This is no reason to lower your confidence that 2 + 2 = 4, but 
rather, to revise your belief that this person is an epistemic peer, at the very least about 
elementary mathematical facts. If someone truly believed that 2 + 2 = 5, this would 
demonstrate that this person is, in all likelihood, not as clear-headed as you. 
Would a religious conversion be more analogous to the mental math or the 
elementary math case? Many people have a response along these lines: “I don’t know 
what happened to Josh. He was such a reasonable guy, but then he joined Scientology. I 
think he’s gone off the cliff,” or, “I used to respect Amy, but now she is no longer an 
Evangelical Christian; I cannot respect her anymore.” In such cases, people treat the 
conversion as a situation where one’s epistemic peer has acquired such an outlandish 
set of beliefs that they begin to doubt the peerhood, akin to the elementary math case. 
In other cases, where the new belief is at least a live option (in the Jamesian sense), the 
case may appear more like the mental math case (e.g., “I’m not Jewish, but it does look 
like an interesting religion with a rich theology. Yehuda might be right, or I might be”). 
There is a further problem for treating conversion cases as peer disagreements: religious 
conversions tend to be transformative. This makes it hard to see whether the person is 
still one’s epistemic peer, or what the proper response should be. As a result of this 
transformation, the beliefs of a dissenting peer, arising from a religious conversion, do 
not have straightforward evidential value.7 
 
2. Conversion as a transformative experience 
 
Some experiences transform us, both in who we are and what we know. L.A. Paul has 
termed such experiences “transformative experiences.”8 They are personally 
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transformative, in that they change who you are as a person, and they are epistemically 
transformative, in that they give you new information by virtue of a particular 
experience that can only be obtained by having that experience. Paul has argued that 
we cannot rationally make decisions that will transform us because there is an 
asymmetry between who we are now, and what we know now, and who we will be 
then. We cannot make a comparison between before and after to calculate the 
expected utility, for example, adopting a child may be a wonderful experience for my 
friend, but I may come to regret it. Yet we often make life-changing decisions: moving 
country, getting married, or joining a religious denomination. Not all transformative 
experiences are the result of conscious decisions. Becoming long-term ill or disabled is a 
situation few people choose, yet it transforms what they know (e.g., what it is like to live 
in the face of imminent death), and who they are (e.g., someone who became blind). 
The transformative nature of disability is illustrated by how disabled and non-disabled 
people think about their quality of life: sighted people tend to think being blind is a lot 
worse than blind people think it is, including blind people who were previously sighted.9  
Is religious conversion transformative? Saul/Paul’s conversion to Christianity on 
the road to Damascus suggests that a single transformative event can lie at the basis of 
conversion. As recorded in Acts 9 (in a third-person narrative) and the Pauline epistles 
such as Galatians 1 (in a first-person narrative), Saul of Tarsus was a Jew who 
persecuted the early Christian community. On his way to Damascus, where he was 
extending his mission to have Christians imprisoned, he had a dramatic religious 
experience: he saw a blinding light, and heard the voice of the risen Christ, who asked 
him why he was persecuting him. Saul then got baptized, and started missionary work 
for the nascent Christian Church. This account of conversion in terms of a single 
dramatic experience shaped subsequent discussions of what conversion is like, for 
instance in the work of early psychologists such as William James.10 Subsequent 
research into religious conversions suggests a more gradual pattern. Conversions are 
not single experiences, but rather the cumulative effect of many smaller experiences 
and decisions. Even among people who self-identify as born-again Christians, the 
majority experience a gradual, rather than a sudden, conversion to Evangelical 
Protestantism.11 Nevertheless, religious conversions transform a person’s system of 
beliefs (thus are epistemically transformative), and change their personality. This is not 
so much a change in personality traits, but in goals, feelings, attitudes, and life 
meaning.12  
Given that a person, post-conversion, is both epistemically and personally 
transformed, it becomes difficult to gauge whether a former epistemic peer is still an 
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epistemic peer. For example, Jonathan Edwards has an extensive record of the 
deepening of his faith in several phases:  
 
. . . my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and 
more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of 
everything was altered: there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast, 
or appearance of divine glory, in almost everything. God’s excellency, his 
wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything; in the sun, 
moon, and stars, in the clouds and blue sky, in the grass, flowers, trees, in 
the water and all nature; which used greatly to fix my mind.13  
 
How can we know that Edwards, post-conversion, is in an epistemically better position 
than before? How can Edwards himself know this is the case?  
 
3. Disagreement with one’s former self  
 
Conversion thus gives rise to two forms of disagreement—disagreement with 
one’s former self, and disagreement with friends and family. Let’s look at someone like 
Catherine, who is now in disagreement with her former self. She now believes things 
she would have found implausible just a year ago. Should she accord more credence to 
her new beliefs? If conversion were solely the result of a careful, rational deliberation, it 
would seem proper that the convert is more confident about her beliefs post-
conversion. However, conversion occurs as a result of several factors. These include the 
desire to be of the same religious denomination of one’s family and friends, or the 
desire for self-improvement and for having a religion that is more in line with one’s self-
image. For example, in a qualitative study on French young adults who converted to 
Islam, several people mentioned that they believed regular prayer and observing food 
taboos and the Ramadan would help them be more personally disciplined.14 Such 
concerns may be practically rational, but do not say much about the truth or falsity of 
the beliefs one adopts.  
The influential Lofland-Stark model15 of religious conversion outlines two basic 
conditions that prompt religious conversion: first, persons must feel an acute need or 
tension within their religious problem-solving perspective, and second, they form 
affective bonds with members of the new religion/affiliation they convert to, which 
facilitates the step to the new religious movement. This model has attracted much 
attention in the social study of religion. More recent sociological accounts of conversion 
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identify two types of attraction of religious movements to new converts: ideological, 
through offering a new perspective on life, and social, by providing a satisfactory social 
network.16  
 Thus, conversion seems to be to a large extent the result of irrelevant causal 
factors, such as the presence of social groups that one might feel at home with and seek 
closer affiliation with. However, one’s original religious beliefs (or lack thereof) are also 
largely the result of irrelevant influences. Vavova defines an irrelevant influence as 
follows:17  
 
An irrelevant influence for me with respect to my belief that p is one that 
(a) has influenced my belief that p and (b) does not bear on the truth of p. 
 
There is a continued debate on whether irrelevant influences on our beliefs can act as 
defeaters. This debate often centers on the question of whether our response to the 
evidence allows for some latitude, as permissivists propose, or whether a total body of 
evidence only allows for one rational attitude, as proponents of uniqueness hold.18  
If we assume that sociologists are right and most conversions are caused by a 
mixture of social and personal factors, few of which are relevant to the truth of the 
beliefs, how should a convert evaluate her past self’s beliefs? Vavova recommends that 
in order to evaluate the epistemic significance of irrelevant influences, we need to look 
at what causes these influences. If the influences give “good independent reason to 
think that you are mistaken with respect to p, you must revise your confidence in p 
accordingly—insofar as you can.”19 For instance, if a belief is the result of brainwashing 
or wishful thinking, this does seem to present substantial higher-order evidence that 
undermines the belief. Extreme cases of conversion that involve indoctrination or 
coercive force would thus be cast in a negative light, as indoctrination and coercion are 
in general poor belief-forming mechanisms. But for many other cases, which involve the 
typical mixture of social factors and personal motivations, it is not so clear whether 
these irrelevant influences provide the convert with a good independent reason that she 
is mistaken with respect to her new beliefs. The factors underlying conversion cases do 
not seem to be more epistemically vicious or benign than factors underlying original 
religious belief formation (e.g., parental religious affiliation).  
 A religious convert has one piece of higher-order evidence that someone who 
does not convert does not possess, namely first-personal experience of changing one’s 
religious beliefs in a deep and significant way: the convert knows that her religious 
beliefs can be changed. This is in addition to any first-order evidence that prompted the 
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conversion, e.g., Paul’s religious experience on the Road to Damascus. (Note that not all 
conversion cases involve such first-order evidence; some may be purely the result of 
social factors and do not offer any first-order evidence, but then the convert still has the 
second-order evidence of having converted). This might lead a convert to become more 
accepting and open to the religious views of others (after all, the convert had different 
religious beliefs prior to her conversion). If Catherine now holds beliefs she found 
implausible just a year ago, this tells her something meaningful not just about her 
current religious beliefs, but about the fragility and revisability of religious beliefs in 
general. Thus it would seem rational for a convert to remain open to the views of 
dissenting epistemic peers. By contrast, Miguel does not have the relevant experiences 
that presumably were at least in part the basis of Catherine’s conversion. Given that he 
has not, he should remain open to the possibility that Catherine has relevant evidence 
that he lacks. Thus, conciliationism seems a rational response in the light of conversion 
of a former epistemic peer. I will look in more detail at this question in the next section.  
 
4. Disagreement with a recently converted peer 
 
I will now look at the question of what (if any) epistemic conclusions Miguel can draw 
from Catherine’s conversion, in the absence of further information (let’s assume 
Catherine had to dash to the airport; so Miguel never gets to hear her reasons). Should 
it lower his confidence in his complacent atheism? One could argue that Catherine’s 
conversion does not provide Miguel with any new information. Miguel is presumably 
aware of the distribution of opinions about theism. He knows that most of the world 
population (about 85-90%) are theists (most of these are monotheists),20 and that a 
substantial number of academics (albeit still less than 50%) are atheists.21 He might also 
know that 73% of academic philosophers are atheists.22 Since Miguel shares most of his 
background beliefs with academic philosophers, he would probably consider them to be 
his epistemic peers. Miguel could maintain his credences accordingly. There does not 
seem to be any special information gained by an old friend having converted to a belief 
he does not share.  
However, Miguel has acquired one new piece of information: someone with 
whom he had many background beliefs in common, and whom he has always respected 
as his epistemic peer, changed her mind on the question of theism. If he considers 
Catherine to be similar to him in many respects (e.g., shared graduate school 
experience), they are similar in relevant background knowledge. Thus it would seem 
epistemically prudent for Miguel to at least follow up with Catherine (e.g., a simple 
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email saying something like, “Hey, Catherine. It was great to meet up with you. I have to 
confess I was a bit surprised that you’re a theist now. Could you tell me more about 
it?”). Maybe Catherine has reasons that Miguel has not properly considered.  
 There is another reason why the conversion of a friend who was (at least 
previously) an epistemic peer is significant: we tend to attach more weight to the 
testimony of those who are close to us than to the testimony of strangers. Maybe this is 
because we can gauge the epistemic credentials of familiar individuals better. But 
familiarity alone does not explain the extra weight we accord to those near and dear to 
us. After all, if that were the case, we would put more stock in former friends or in 
frenemies, and this does not seem to be the case (indeed, we tend to be more cautious 
when it comes to both categories). Being friends engenders epistemic partiality.23 
Already very young children show the tendency to value the testimony of people close 
to them more than the testimony of strangers.24 This heuristic makes sense in the 
context of epistemic vigilance: since we not only need to sort out accurate from 
inaccurate testifiers, but also those who are truthful from deceitful, it makes sense to 
trust people who are well disposed toward us. Thus people have a tendency to place 
selective trust in people they see as benevolent: people with whom we have a trusting 
relationship are less likely to deceive us.25  
 Trust in friends may also be valuable beyond purely epistemic reasons, just like 
self-trust is intrinsically valuable.26 Some feminist epistemologists have emphasized the 
value of certain kinds of partiality: intellectual theorizing should not be seen as purely 
dissociated from our emotional lives.27 For such reasons, Miguel should be more diligent 
in following up Catherine’s reasons for converting. And perhaps likewise, Catherine 
should be diligent in following up with Miguel to explain her reasons for converting. I 
will now look at a case study of conversion that will illustrate why reasoned debate is 
the proper response to a friend’s, and one’s own, conversion.  
 
5. Rational argument and conversion 
 
The African theologian and church father Augustine of Hippo (354–430) converted from 
Manichaeism to Christianity. In both religious traditions, he was an apologist, a teacher, 
and an evangelist. The letter De Utilitate Credendi (The Usefulness of Belief)28 is 
addressed to Honoratus, a student friend. Augustine converted his friend to 
Manichaeism with much difficulty, and in the letter set himself the unenviable task to 
try to convince his friend to convert to Christianity. But why should Honoratus, whom he 
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previously persuaded of the merits of Manichaeism, now trust Augustine? As Asiedu 
writes,  
 
For Augustine to achieve his purposes, Honoratus would have to be persuaded 
of Augustine’s trustworthiness while discounting Augustine’s much earlier 
evangelistic campaigns as a Manichee. Honoratus would also have to grant that 
Augustine himself had not been deceived a second time as he appears to have 
been misled the first time when he was persuaded by the Manichees.29  
 
 The letter is revealing in that Augustine does not point to his own conversion 
experience as a source of knowledge, as he does elsewhere (e.g., in his Confessions).30   
Rather, the letter focuses on biblical hermeneutics (the discrepancies between the Old 
and New Testaments, which Manicheans often pointed out as reasons to reject 
Christianity) and on high-level epistemological principles such as trust and credibility. 
The letter focuses on the reasons Manicheans gave for rejecting Catholic doctrines, and 
argues that these reasons were mistaken. In this way, Augustine argues that Honoratus’ 
(and his former self’s) reasons for accepting the Manichaean doctrine were mistaken:  
 
Well, they harangued at great length and with great vigour against the 
errors of simple people, which I have since learned is extremely easy for 
anyone to do who is moderately educated; and if they taught us any of 
their own doctrines we thought we must maintain it because nothing 
else occurred to us to set our minds at rest.31  
 
The passage in viii, 20 recounts Augustine’s own faith journey (what born-again 
Christians would call their “testimony”). He first reveals that he was already “in a state 
of serious doubt” about Manichaeism when he last parted from his friend, and that his 
doubt grew even more after he saw the underwhelming performance by the famous 
Manichean Faustus. “You remember, his coming to explain all our difficulties was held 
out to us as a gift from heaven. Well, I recognized that he was no better than the others 
of the sect, except for a certain eloquence he had.”32  While Augustine does not use his 
own conversion as a source of evidence to Honoratus, he nevertheless presents it as a 
model that Honoratus can emulate. For example, he draws close parallels between his 
own former doubts (now happily resolved), and Honoratus' present doubts. This echoes 
the conciliationist position in the epistemology of disagreement, where the beliefs of 
others we respect as our peers provide significant evidence (in part because our peers 
may have reasons or arguments we may not have considered properly), and where 
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these beliefs call for belief revision. 
The letter (particularly sections vii–xi) develops an intricate philosophy of 
testimony, where Augustine asserts that all knowledge must begin in trust of those who 
have proper authority, rather than in reason. He gives the example of the trust we place 
in our parents:  
 
. . . how will children serve their parents and love them with mutual dutifulness if 
they do not believe that they are their parents. That cannot be known by reason. 
Who the father is, is believed on the authority of the mother, and as to the 
mother, midwives, nurses, slaves have to be believed, for the mother can 
deceive, being herself deceived by having her son stolen and another put in his 
place.33  
 
To Augustine, the chief problem with Manicheans is that they do not recognize the 
importance of trust in testimony of those who have proper authority. Instead they hold 
up a mirage of how we should acquire beliefs: “they promise to give to those whom 
they attract a reason even for their most obscure doctrines.”34 Thus, they are not being 
intellectually honest with their adherents and converts, because it is simply not possible 
to give reasons for obscure doctrines, without resorting to trust in authoritative 
testifiers.35  
In De Utilitate Credendi Augustine sees testimony merely as a basis of belief. In 
his Confessions (397-401) he also regards it as a basis for knowledge.36 Yet, in the former 
he clearly sees testimony as a precondition for knowledge, as many people would lack 
the relevant reasoning skills to work out religious truths for themselves. Augustine 
draws an illuminating parallel between friendship and trust in testimony. Against those 
who do not think that testimony can be a useful source of belief, Augustine argues, “I do 
not see how anyone who accepts that as true can ever have a friend. For if to believe 
anything is base, either it is base to believe a friend, or without such belief I cannot see 
how anyone can go on speaking about friendship.”37 While it is not explicit, it is clear 
that Augustine here is appealing to his friend to read his arguments with more charity 
and patience than he would read the arguments from a Catholic writer he does not 
know, namely with the charity one owes a friend. The tone throughout the letter 
underlines this point, with Augustine frequently expressing understanding at what must 
be a surprise to his friend, for example, “You are amazed, I am sure. For I cannot 
pretend that I was not formerly of a very different opinion”;38 he frequently anticipates 
objections Honoratus might have, such as, “But you will probably ask to be given a 
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plausible reason why, in being taught, you must begin with faith and not rather with 
reason.”39 
Overall, De Utilitate Credendi shows a good model of peer disagreement in the 
face of conversion. Augustine’s aims in the letter are modest. As he points out in his 
closing paragraphs, he does not refute the Manichean doctrines or defend Catholic 
ones. Rather, he aims to show that the arguments that Manicheans have offered against 
Catholic doctrines (namely, alleged discrepancies between the Old and New 
Testaments) are not as strong as he previously believed. He also argues that 
Manicheism does not live up to its own standards of belief based on reason, rather than 
testimony—a standard that Augustine also demonstrates to be unattainable. Along the 
way, Augustine can also demonstrate to himself (as he also did at length in his 
Confessions) that he is now in a better epistemic position than his pre-conversion self. 
Even though Augustine may not be justified in thinking he now holds the correct 
doctrines, his new beliefs are based on more sophisticated grounds, whereas his 




The case of religious conversion presents a series of difficulties for traditional accounts 
of epistemic peer disagreement, because conversion is a transformative experience: it is 
difficult to compare whether a convert is in a better epistemic position post-conversion. 
Conversion is rarely the outcome of a rational decision process, but the result of 
irrelevant causal factors such as the religious views of friends and personal tension. This 
was almost certainly the case for Augustine, as we can see in passages throughout De 
De Utilitate Credendi, for example, “When I departed from you across the sea I was 
already in a state of serious doubt; what was I to hold; what was I to give up? Indeed my 
hesitation grew greater day by day from the time that I heard the famous Faustus.”40 
Most cases of conversion are not caused by forces that are more pernicious than the 
ones that gave rise to the original set of beliefs (e.g., beliefs of one’s parents). Given that 
both self-trust and trust in friends is valuable (for epistemic and non-epistemic reasons), 
it does not seem wrong to accord prima facie weight to a friend’s new set of beliefs, if 
one saw this friend as an epistemic peer prior to conversion. Rational argument and 
dialogue, as illustrated by Augustine, can play a crucial role in evaluating peer 
disagreement caused by conversion. It not only helps one’s friends to critically evaluate 
their beliefs, but also allows the convert to critically reflect on her own.  
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